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he annual climate change conference 
(COP14/CMP4)
1 will take place in Poznań, 
1–12 December 2008. This Policy Brief aims 
at providing a brief assessment of where we are on 
the road from Bali to Copenhagen,
2 thinking ahead 
of Poznań in relation to the current negotiating 
environment and exploring the possible nature of an 
agreed outcome to be reached in Copenhagen at the 
end of 2009.  
1.  Where are we now? The road from 
Bali to Copenhagen 
The United Nations climate change conference 
(COP13/CMP3) was held in Bali in December 2007. 
The Kyoto Protocol sets out only the first 
commitment period (2008–12) and requires the 
Parties to the Protocol to start negotiations for 
subsequent periods in 2005, so that no gap arises 
between commitment periods. The Bali conference 
delivered a mandate for launching a two-year 
negotiation process, with a clear deadline for the 
agreed outcome on cooperation beyond 2012 to be 
reached in Copenhagen in December 2009. This 
mandate is supported by an agreed roadmap.  
There are different views about the nature of the Bali 
roadmap. An early reflection was that the Bali 
conference did not really produce a roadmap but a 
sketch of a route over unmapped territory and 
negotiators would have to create the necessary roads 
and milestones. The challenge was how to turn the 
Bali sketch into a veritable roadmap (Macey, 2007). 
Another view recognises that there is indeed a 
roadmap. Yet the map does not show a highway, but 
a bumpy road full of pitfalls and devious terrain, 
                                                      
1 COP14/CMP4 refers to the Fourteenth Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)/Fourth Session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
2 For a briefing about COP14 in Poznań, see Fujiwara 
(2008). 
with some of the routes possibly turning out to be 
cul-de-sacs (Watanabe et al., 2008). Worse still it 
may look like a path, even “a rough and narrow goat 
track” leading along a cliff edge (Christoff, 2008), if 
not “ending up in the sea” (IISD, 2007).  
On paper, even though there is no clear definition, 
the Bali roadmap refers to a set of decisions. The 
centrepiece of the roadmap is the Bali Action Plan. 
In addition to delivering the negotiating mandate, the 
Action Plan tasked a new ad-hoc working group
3 to 
draw a shared vision for long-term cooperative 
action with four building blocks or pillars: 
mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing. 
The shared vision and the four building blocks are 
likely to shape the structure of the overall 2012 
architecture. 
2.  Thinking ahead of Poznań and the 
negotiating environment 
Poznań is halfway on the road from Bali to 
Copenhagen and marks a turning point at which 
negotiators change their gears from the analytical or 
discussion mode to that of full negotiations. In 
preparation for the EU position at the COP14/CMP4 
in Poznań, the EU Environment Council notes that 
developing countries as a group, in particular the 
                                                      
3 More specifically, the group is the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention. 
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most advanced among them, would have to reduce 
their emissions by 15-30% below business as usual 
in order to be consistent with the EU objective of 
staying within the threshold of two degrees. The 
Environment Council also acknowledges the 
growing diversity among developing countries and 
calls for stronger actions in proportion to their 
capacities. Developing countries that are 
economically more advanced should make adequate 
contributions according to their responsibilities and 
capabilities. The nature and level of ambition of 
measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-
appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
countries will differ among countries and sectors 
(Council of the European Union, 2008).  
Developing countries are more diverse now than 
they were when the Kyoto Protocol was designed. 
Among developing countries, each group of 
countries has its own priority. For Africa, the 
mitigation challenge would be “avoiding emissions” 
rather than “emission reductions” (van Schalkwyk, 
2008). Their immediate concern is adaptation to the 
impacts of climate change, which is shared by other 
least-developed countries (LDCs) and small island 
developing states. Another priority for Africa, 
poverty reduction, should go hand in hand with 
avoided deforestation and consequently halting 
desertification. For energy-scarce countries at any 
stage of development, a priority would be to reduce 
dependency on imported fossil fuels through energy 
efficiency improvements, and for those with non-
fossil fuel resource endowments to introduce low-
carbon technology either on its own or with support 
from advanced economies. Even OPEC countries 
may gradually realise the merit of reducing 
dependence on oil production and diversifying the 
structure of their economies. Lastly, for emerging 
economies, the main task would be to decouple 
energy consumption from GDP growth, and leapfrog 
an economy based on fossil fuels on the way to a 
low-carbon economy with the aid of advanced clean 
technology and support for capacity-building. Some 
countries are already taking concrete steps towards 
mitigation and are capable of strengthening their 
actions. Thus it is important to determine how to 
reward emerging economies’ early actions that are 
taking place without mandatory targets.
4 In the 
future, there will be a possibility for so-called 
‘south–south cooperation’, replicating in developing 
countries the successful models of energy efficiency 
improvements in emerging economies.   
                                                      
4 For example, Winkler et al. (2008) examine the ways to 
operationalise sustainable development policies and 
measures (SD-PAMs). 
As the financial crisis deepens and the global 
economy shows signs of slowing down, costs to the 
economy are likely to play a larger role in a political 
debate. It is widely assumed that the pains of the 
financial crisis and its early effects on the real 
economy have been felt among the US and other 
developed, transition or emerging economies alike. 
Success in international coordination of economic 
and financial policies could help ease the tension 
between developed economies and emerging ones.  
It is important to recall here that the Kyoto Protocol 
was negotiated in a challenging environment just like 
now. In 1997, the Asian financial market was thrown 
into turmoil, starting in Thailand in July and rapidly 
spreading to the rest of South-East and East Asia, 
which was felt as far as Brazil and Russia (Wing, 
2007). Nevertheless, Parties gathered in Japan to 
close a deal about quantified emission reduction 
commitments and flexible mechanisms, which 
resulted in the Kyoto Protocol. It is beyond the scope 
of this Policy Brief to compare the cause, scale or 
impacts of the current financial crisis with those of 
the Asian financial crisis 11 years ago. This is just a 
reminder that one would not expect the best possible 
environment for negotiations and that actually the 
Protocol itself was born out of the financial storm 
then blowing around Asia and the world. Hence, the 
so-called ‘cost containment’ aspect is already built 
into the flexible mechanisms, such as Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism established under the Kyoto Protocol.  
3.  What will a Copenhagen deal look 
like? 
Since annual UN climate conferences have been 
notorious for striking a last-minute deal among 
ministers well stretched into the early morning of the 
final day, it is nearly impossible to foresee what will 
likely come out of the Copenhagen conference. 
Nonetheless, a few points are becoming increasingly 
clear as discussion progresses.  
First, the Copenhagen deal would result in not only 
an agreed outcome about further commitments but 
also a comprehensive agreement on the post-2012 
architecture. The new architecture will likely be 
based on multiple layers of institutions, rule books 
(e.g. the Marrakech Accords) and procedures that 
have evolved over more than a decade. The 
UNFCCC has laid the foundation for the Kyoto 
Protocol and any successive agreements on climate 
change. The structure of the Kyoto Protocol will 
remain legally valid regardless of the expiry of the 
first commitment period or uncertainty about the 
subsequent commitment periods. If the Kyoto 
Protocol continues to form part of the new 
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change to its format as well as its components. The 
overall structure of the Kyoto Protocol rests on the 
delicate balance of several components – such as 
commitments, flexible mechanisms and the transfer 
of finance and technology – which are altogether 
designed to facilitate the participation of countries. 
Therefore, if the nature and types of further 
commitments change significantly, these changes 
will affect not only other components but also the 
whole architecture of the Protocol. Indeed, the new 
architecture will require an even more careful 
balance of components than before owing to subjects 
that were excluded from the Protocol at the time of 
the agreement or that have since moved to the top of 
the agenda, such as the coverage of aviation and 
maritime transport adaptation, and avoided 
deforestation. Added to these subjects are 
outstanding commitments for Annex I Parties that 
have shown slow progress: finance and technology. 
Each subject is directly linked to the others, 
especially in terms of the cost implications, which 
would foster interlinking the issues for negotiations 
but undermine the effectiveness of the new 
architecture in guiding implementation by increasing 
complexity.  
Second, given the time constraints, based on the 
model of the Marrakech Accords detailing the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Copenhagen deal would address the 
post-2012 architecture with some principles for the 
key components including further commitments, 
leaving the possibility to elaborate the details of the 
individual components at a later stage. For example, 
the Copenhagen deal could concentrate on setting the 
level of a cap on a range of GHG emissions for at 
least the major emitters, thus encompassing 
developed, transition and emerging economies as 
well as OPEC countries with some differentiation 
based on smaller groups rather than individual 
parties. If the time is too short, Parties might agree 
on the principle of having caps on emissions from 
certain countries, and later decide on the level of the 
caps. Parties should then agree on the kinds of 
instruments to be used, some of which are available 
for a specific group, to comply with the 
commitments. For example, step 1 could include 
cap-setting with principles for flexible mechanisms, 
technology and finance. The next round of 
negotiations could focus on the allocation of 
assigned amounts among individual Parties within 
each group. Parties should agree on the designs of 
the instruments. For instance, step 2 could cover 
allocation, with outlines of flexible mechanisms and 
those concerning funds for technology, adaptation, 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and capacity-building. Each group of 
developing countries (e.g. the G77 and China, the 
Alliance of Small Island States and LDCs) not only 
sets its own priority but also its preference for the 
kinds of actions and method for crediting such 
actions in the form of tradable units. Such a step-by-
step approach would enable Parties to stress the joint 
leadership in Copenhagen and together send a strong 
signal to the market, business and citizens for a leap 
in the transition towards a low-carbon economy.  
Third, the Copenhagen deal would build the post-
2012 architecture on a more decentralised and 
flexible structure than its predecessor. It would entail 
less rigidity in the overall architecture, reflecting a 
shift in the economic capabilities of parties; 
increasing mobility among groups of countries on 
the ladder of making stronger commitments; and 
enlarging a portfolio of instruments to meet 
commitments, including innovative tools or tradable 
units to enable a variety of actions contributing to 
GHG emission reductions to be counted. For each of 
the above elements governance would be the key. 
Specific questions about the governance of and 
institutional arrangements for individual mechanisms 
should be addressed at a later stage. 
To summarise, if successful, the Copenhagen deal 
could result in an agreement on the post-2012 
architecture that is more decentralised and flexible, 
with some principles on the main components 
including further commitments. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
Since the Kyoto Protocol was designed, developing 
countries have shown more diversity in their profiles, 
which would increase the complexity in the structure 
of the negotiations. A pragmatic Copenhagen deal 
would concentrate on the shape of the overall post-
2012 architecture with some principles guiding 
crucial components. This architecture would be 
based on a more decentralised and flexible structure. 
A pragmatic step-by-step approach could help to 
drive the negotiation process slowly but steadily. 
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